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Reporting Substantial Product Safety Hazards 
Under the Consumer Product Safety Act: The 
Products Liability Interface 
TIMOTHY D. ZICK* 
Congress enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act' (CPSA) in 1972 in 
response to a perception that the common law of products liability did not 
adequately protect consumers from dangerous products. 2 Unlike earlier 
piecemeal efforts,3 Congress enacted a regulatory scheme whose mandate 
might best be summed up as a collective command to make almost every-
thing safer.4 However, Congress failed to adequately consider the potential 
• J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1992; A.B., Indiana University, 1988. I would like 
to thank Professor Joseph Page of Georgetown University Law Center for his guidance and assist-
ance in developing this note. 
1. Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1988)). President 
Nixon signed the CPSA into law on October 27, 1972. For a comprehensive analysis of the Act and 
the commission charged with its enforcement, see MICHAEL R. LEMOV, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY COMMISSION (1981). 
2. In 1967, Congress established the National Commission on Product Safety (NCPS) (National 
Commission on Product Safety Act § 2a, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1262 (1982)) to "conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of the scope and ade-
quacy of measures now employed to protect consumers against unreasonable risk of injuries which 
may be caused by hazardous household products." LEMOV, supra note 1, at 1-10 (citation omitted). 
The NCPS concluded that the common law of products liability was unreliable in restraining prod-
uct hazards because it was most concerned with providing post-injury remedies. 1970 NAT'L CoM-
MISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REP. 3. The common law of products liability serves to 
provide after-the-fact redress for persons injured through the fault of another. Common law was 
not originally regarded as a watchdog for marketing practice. To the extent that it deters the mar-
keting of dangerous products, common law serves a function similar to that of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission, which was created by the CPSA. CPSA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2053. Whether 
product safety is better left to pervasive federal regulation is a matter beyond the scope of this note. 
For now, the Commission coexists with the common law system. 
3. Prior to the CPSA, congressional efforts to regulate product safety usually took the form of 
specific legislation reacting to public concern over specific hazards. See, e.g., Flammable Fabrics 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1988) (enacted in 1953 in response to series of fires involving children 
wearing highly flammable clothing); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-76 
(1960) (enacted in 1960 in response to children being poisoned, burned, and otherwise injured by 
inadequately labeled products such as detergents and cleaning agents); National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988) (enacted in response to rising number of 
injuries and deaths on the nation's highways). 
4. See CPSA § 3(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (every manufacturer, retailer, distributor, and importer 
distributing any "consumer product" in commerce is subject to the sweeping jurisdiction of the 
Commission). 
The Commission's jurisdiction is limited only by the statute's specific exclusion of products al-
ready subject to comprehensive federal safety statutes. CPSA § 3(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l) (ex-
cluding tobacco products, motor vehicles, pesticides, aircraft, boats, drugs or cosmetics, and food). 
In addition to the CPSA, the Commission also administers the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1191-1204, the Refrigerator Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-14 (1988), the Federal Hazardous 
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interaction between its solution and the products liability scheme already in 
place. Whether intended or not, there is a substantial "interface" between 
the CPSA and products liability. s 
Section 15(b) of the CPSA requires manufacturers to report without delay 
to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (Commission) any information 
reasonably indicating a product "defect" that has caused or could cause a 
death or grievous injury.6 Section 15 has become a favored enforcement tool 
Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-76, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1471-76 (1988). Discussion in this note is limited to the CPSA. 
5. The lack of sensitivity to the interface between the Commission's work and the products liabil-
ity system is aptly demonstrated in the following colloquy which occurred during CPSA appropria-
tions hearings between Senator John C. Danforth arid Mr. Andrew Krulwich, former General 
Council to the Consumer Product Safety Commission: 
SENATOR DANFORTH. It seems to me that if it's not being done already, what we 
should do is to take a look at the interrelationship between the work of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the use of the litigation as a protective measure-that is, as a 
means of increasing the cost of producing dangerous items and therefore keeping them off 
the market-and the availability of insurance to manufacturers of products .... 
MR. KRULWICH .... [T)here obviously is a relationship between what the Commission 
does for product safety, what happens in the private sector in the product liability area, 
and, frankly, the insurance sector .... 
SENATOR DANFORTH. You know, it's the stuff that law review articles are made of. 
But it does not, as far as I know, have anything to do with Government policy. 
We have a Consumer Product Safety Commission that goes about studying things and 
putting out regulations and pulling things off the market. On the other hand, we have the 
availability of the courts, the products liability cases. 
Hearings on Consumer Product Safety Commission Reauthorization Before the Subcomm. for Con-
sumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., lst Sess., 40-
41 (1981). 
The conception that the CPSA and common law operate in separate spheres is inaccurate. 
Although the architects of the CPSA disclaimed any intent to alter common-law remedies, there is 
little doubt that the Act had a profound impact on products liability practice. The interface was 
recognized early in the Act's history. See Arnold B. Elkind, Consumer Product Safety Act, 9 TRIAL 
43, 43 (1973) (noting the likelihood that plaintiffs' lawyers would use information divulged to Com-
mission). In spite of Senator Danforth's invitation, law reviews have neglected to examine the inter-
face. 
This note addresses only one of the myriad intersections between the Commission's work and 
common law of products liability. For an early general discussion, see John S. Martel, The Con-
sumer Product Safety Act and Its Relation to Private Products Litigation, 10 THE FORUM 337 
(1974). 
6. CPSA § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. 2064(b). 
The "substantial product hazard" reporting requirement found in § 15 is no anomaly in the mod-
em regulatory era. Mandatory reporting of adverse risk information has become a requirement in a 
host of statutes regulating the public health. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988) (manufacturers who learn that motor vehicle either contains a 
"defect" that "relates to motor vehicle safety" or does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle 
safety standard must notify, among others, the Secretary of Transportation); Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1988) (any manufacturer, processor, or distributor of a chemical 
substance who learns that substance "presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment" must report to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency). 
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of the Commission. 7 
Failure to report to the Commission leaves a firm open to, among other 
penalties, costly civil and criminal liability. 8 In spite of these penalties, there 
is substantial underreporting of product defects. 9 Consequently, many of the 
7. The significance of§ 15 as a Commission enforcement tool cannot be overstated. As early as 
1975, former Commission Chairman Richard 0. Simpson stated: 
There is no question but that Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act has 
proven to be a key feature of the law-more key, I think, than was envisioned either by 
the Congress in writing the legislation, or the Commission in its initial appraisal of re-
sources needs [sic] and priorities. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission Oversight: Hearings on S. 644 and S. ]()()()Before the Sub-
comm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1975). Section 
15 has become the Commission's primary enforcement weapon. 
8. Failure to furnish immediately the information required under CPSA § 15 is an unlawful act. 
CPSA § 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(4). A "knowing" violation of§ 19 subjects a firm to civil 
penalties. See CPSA § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2069 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (penalties not to exceed $5,000 for 
individual violation or $1,250,000 for any series of violations). Violation of§ 19 after a "notice of 
noncompliance" from the Commission may give rise to a $50,000 fine or a one-year prison term, or 
both. CPSA § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (1988). 
9. According to the Commission, roughly 150 to 200 product hazard reports are filed each year. 
SENATE CoMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON THE CoNSUMER 
PRODUCT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1990 (S. 605), S. REP. No. 37, 10lst Cong., 1st Sess. 10 
(1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4407, 4416 [hereinafter IMPROVEMENT ACT REPORT). 
While the degree of underreporting under § 15 is difficult to measure, Congress is convinced that 
the number of reports received annually is far too low. See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF 
THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE ON THE CoNSUMER SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1990 (H.R. 
914, 10lst Cong., 2d Sess. 21 ("The Committee is also concerned about the inadequacy of the 
current level of product hazard reporting under Section 15(b) of the CPSA"), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4419, 4423. 
Underreporting has plagued the Commission for most, if not all of, its existence. Former Com-
mission Chairman Stuart Statler's comments are illustrative: 
Rough estimates indicate that about two million separate firms are engaged in the man-
ufacture, distribution, or sale of consumer products .... When these data are set alongside 
the expansive language of Section 15(b), it seems reasonable to expect that the Commis-
sion would receive a sizable number of Section 15(b) reports. Making very conservative 
assumptions, if each year only one out of every 1,000 fj.rms received a consumer complaint 
about a product containing information of the sort described by Section 15(b), with two 
million firms in the consumer product business, the Commission should receive close to 
2,000 reports. In reality, the number of reports received is but a fraction of this figure, 
averaging only 116 per year over the past three years. 
Stuart Statler, Reporting Guidelines Under Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 7 J. 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 89, 91 (1984) (footnotes omitted). Statler felt that these were very conserva-
tive assumptions. ld. at 91 n.9; see also Michael A. Brown, CPSC Getting More Aggressive About 
the Reporting of Hazards, NAT'L L.J., May 7, 1984, at 21 (one commissioner felt proper level of 
reporting should be 1,000, 5,000, or even 10,000 reports per year). It is clear that underreporting 
persists. The 150 to 200 reports received are in sharp contrast to the levels of reporting under other 
safety acts. For example, the Food and Drug Administration receives about 18,000 reports every 
year on medical devices. President Signs CPSC Reauthorization Bill, 18 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 48, at 1318 (Nov. 30, 1990). 
The underreporting problem is complicated by the tendency of the failure to report to be most 
pronounced for more serious product hazards. See IMPROVEMENT ACT REPORT, supra, at 10 (in-
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most dangerous products remain on the market long after the dangers they 
pose become known. One reason for this degree of underreporting is that a 
firm complying with the reporting requirements faces the prospect of having 
its own Section 15(b) reports used by plaintiffs in subsequent products liabil-
ity lawsuits. 10 This note argues that alleviating the dilemma of manufactur-
ers caught between the reporting requirements of Section 15 and greater 
products liability exposure will help reduce the problem of underreporting 
and promote the goal of product safety. 
Part I of this note presents an overview of Section 15 of the CPSA and 
briefly examines the perplexing product hazard reporting requirements and 
the possible consequences of reporting upon products liability suits. The 
note then offers two possible solutions to the current underreporting di-
lemma. Part II calls for legislative action to prohibit disclosure and discov-
ery of Section 15(b) reports in private civil suits. Portions of the Consumer 
Product Safety Improvement Act of 1990 (Improvement Act) 11 are used as a 
model for striking the appropriate balance between the Commission's need 
for information and an industry's liability concerns. Part III alternatively 
recommends the application of the common law privilege of "self-critical 
analysis" to Section 15(b) reports as a way of allowing firms to comply with 
the reporting requirements without fear of giving away damaging evidence to 
potential plaintiffs. 
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 15 
Section 15(b) mandates the reporting of adverse risk information. In gen-
eral terms, Section 15 requires every manufacturer, importer, distributor, or 
retailer of a consumer product to report to the Commission upon learning 
that its product does not comply with a consumer product safety rule12 or 
dustry reports only lower level hazards and Commission staff has task of uncovering serious prod-
uct safety defects). 
10. Fear of products liability exposure is a significant disincentive to report for firms. See 
Jonathan S. Kahan, Reponing of Substantial Product Hazards Under Section 15 of the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 30 ADMIN. L. REv. 289, 309 (1978) (products liability implications "perhaps 
the most important negative incentive to reporting"). 
The only Commission study to date on this issue cited several reasons for underreporting: (1) 
fear of potential products liability exposure; (2) fear of unreasonable corrective action by the Com-
mission; (3) belief that failure to report would not be detected; and (4) fear of adverse publicity. 
Brown, supra note 9, at 21. Efforts have been made to combat most of these reporting deterrents. 
The Commission has informed firms that more aggressive attempts to enforce § 15 will be made, id., 
and it has attempted to allay fears by reassuring firms that adverse publicity would be minimal. 
Kahan, supra, at 96-97. These efforts have not increased compliance with § 15. 
11. Pub. L. No. 101-608, 104 Stat. 3110-3124 (1990)(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
12. CPSA § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1988). The Commission is authorized to promulgate 
safety standards under CPSA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2056. Although initial perceptions were that 
mandatory safety standards would occupy much of the Commission's time and resources, the Com-
mission promulgates few safety standards. It is directed to defer where possible to "voluntary" 
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contains a "defect" which could create a "substantial product hazard." 13 
There are several adverse consequences for firms that comply with the re-
porting requirements of Section 15. The Commission, upon receipt of this 
information and after an investigation, may order a recall of the subject prod-
ucts, 14 may seek injunctive relief to prevent further distribution of allegedly 
dangerous products, 15 and may order a firm to notify the public that a haz-
ard exists. 16 A firm also must be prepared to defend the timeliness of its 
reports because failure to file timely Section 15(b) reports may subject the 
firm to costly penalties. 17 Finally, and perhaps most significant, is the in-
crease in products liability exposure that can result from filing a substantial 
product hazard report. 18 Faced with staggering potential liability, firms may 
decide that not reporting is a less costly option than reporting and risking the 
dangers associated with compliance with Section 15. 19 
Although compliance with Section 15's reporting requirements may be 
costly, failure to furnish the information required is a violation of the Act 
and carries its own penalties. 2° Civil penalties may be assessed if a firm 
knowingly fails to report information concerning a substantial product haz-
ard.21 Moreover, a violator could face criminal penalties if a firm knowingly 
and willfully fails to report after receiving a notice of noncompliance from 
the Commission. 22 Congress and the Commission rely upon these deterrents 
to ensure compliance with the reporting provisions. 
Because both reporting and not reporting carry adverse consequences, the 
statutory scheme thrusts firms into a least-costly-alternative analysis. If they 
report, they face possible timeliness penalties, recall orders, damaging public-
standards set by industry. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(b)(l) (West Supp. 1991). Because few products are 
now subject to safety standards, the focus of this note is on reporting product defects. 
13. CPSA § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b). 
14. CPSA § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d). Recalls can be ordered only after the Commission has 
determined that the product in question actually constitutes a "substantial product hazard." Id. 
15. See CPSA § 15(g)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(g)(l) (Commission has power to seek preliminary 
injunction where it has "reason to believe" product presents a substantial hazard). 
16. CPSA § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c). 
17. Thus, even if a firm makes an effort to report, the Commission may seek penalties for failure 
to comply with the immediacy requirement. See CPSA § 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(4) (failure 
to comply with § 15 is a "prohibited act"). A firm guilty of failing to comply with the immediacy 
requirements may be subject to criminal and civil penalties under 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2069-70 (1988 & 
West Supp. 1991 ). See supra note 8 for a discussion of the CPSA penalty provisions. 
18. See infra Part I.B. 
19. As former Commission Chairman Sen. John Byington expressed: "In certain instances the 
adverse product liability implications of reporting may outweigh the adverse statutory implications 
of not reporting." Remarks of Sen. John Byington Before the National Symposium on Chronic 
Hazards Nov. 30, 1977), in Kahan, supra note 10, at 309. Former Chairman Byington's remarks 
may be dated, but his concern is quite timely even some 13 years later. 
20. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the CPSA penalty provisions. 
21. CPSA § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (1988). 
22. CPSA § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 2070. 
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ity, burdensome hearings, and-perhaps most significantly-products liabil-
ity exposure. If they fail to report, civil and criminal penalties may be 
assessed. By placing firms in this precarious position, Congress has planted 
the seeds of the underreporting problem and impeded the Commission's ef-
fectiveness as a product safety regulator. Faced with the specter of expensive 
products liability judgments or settlements, many firms may understandably 
opt not to report at all. 
A. SECTION 15's PERPLEXING REPORTING GUIDELINES 
The statutory language of Section 15(b) is expansive. It requires every 
manufacturer, distributor, and retailer of consumer products to report imme-
diately to the Commission any information known to the firm that reason-
ably supports the conclusion that a product fails to comply with an 
applicable product safety rule, contains a defect which could create a sub-
stantial product hazard, or creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or 
death, unless the firm has actual knowledge that the Commission already has 
been adequately informed.23 
Congress and the Commission have focused their efforts on regulating de-
fective products. To this end, Section 15(b) requires a report whenever a 
product "contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard 
.... "
24 
"Substantial product hazard" is defined as: 
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule 
which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or 
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of 
products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) 
creates a substantial risk of injury to the public. 25 
Section 15(b) was drafted to ensure that the Commission would have 
timely access to information concerning potentially hazardous consumer 
products. Although only one of a number of enforcement tools available to 
the Commission, the substantial hazard reporting provisions set forth in Sec-
tion 15(b) have become "first among equals. " 26 Placing the burden of report-
ing product hazards on private industry is an inexpensive method of policing 
23. CPSA § 15(b), 15 U.S.C § 2064(b). 
Several commentators over the years have attempted to parse the expansive statutory language of 
§ 15(b) and its accompanying detailed regulations. The depth of their analyses attests to the com-
plicated nature of the reporting obligation. See generally Kahan, supra note 10; M. Stuart Madden, 
Consumer Product Safety Act Section 15 and Substantial Product Hazards, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 
195 (1981); Statler, supra note 9; James T. Hosmer, Comment, Federal Regulation of Substantial 
Product Hazards: An Analysis of Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 
717 (1976). 
24. CPSA § 15(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(2). 
25. CPSA § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a). 
26. See Madden, supra note 23, at 195-96 (asserting, and criticizing, the emergence of§ 15 as the 
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the marketplace and preventing product-related injuries for an agency hin-
dered by understaffing and inadequate appropriations. 27 Therefore, it is im-
perative that firms comply with the reporting requirements of Section 15(b). 
The difficulty in interpreting the statute and its accompanying regulations,28 
however, undercuts the effectiveness of the reporting requirements. 
Manufacturers have looked to the Commission to clarify the subjective 
language employed by Congress. The question of when to report has baffied 
firms since the inception of the CPSA. 29 Firms are understandably reluctant 
to concede a product "defect" or "substantial produCt hazard"30 where, in 
primary enforcement tool of the Commission); see also Kahan, supra note 10, at 290 (Commission 
appears to rely heavily on § 15). 
The Commission has an extremely broad range of powers. The Act provides the Commission 
with the authority to set and enforce mandatory safety standards, CPSA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2056, to 
ban unsafe products from the marketplace when a safety standard would not adequately protect the 
public, CPSA § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2057, to work with consumers and industry to foster voluntary 
standards for product safety, CPSA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2056, to order firms to give public notice of a 
substantial hazard associated with a product and to repair, replace, or refund the price of products 
that present a substantial product hazard, CPSA § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 2064, and to provide information 
to help consumers select and use products safely, CPSA § S, 15 U.S.C. § 2054. 
27. Appropriations for the Commission for 1991 and 1992 are set at $42 million and $45 million 
respectively. 15 U.S.C. § 2081 (1988). For an agency with such a sweeping mandate, the Commis-
sion is woefully underfunded. See IMPROVEMENT Acr REPORT, supra note 9, at 10 (budget con-
straints delay critical safety-related work). Reliance on the regulated community to self-police will 
continue absent major funding increases. Those increases are not expected given the Commission's 
public standing. See CPSC Places Ninth On 'Fortune' List of Least-Respected Government Agencies, 
18 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1200 (Nov. 2, 1990) (lack of consensus as to 
political worth translates into budget cuts). 
28. See Robert M. Sussman & Peter L. Winik, The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 
1990, 18 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 1435 (Dec. 21, 1990) (many critics believe 
§ IS(b) not effective because of its vague and open-ended criteria); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 
21 (adversarial climate quickly developed between Commission and firms because firms were often 
confused about the scope of their obligations under § 15). Although the vagueness of§ 15 and its 
regulations is certainly a factor contributing to the underreporting dilemma, this note focuses on the 
adverse products liability implications of reporting as a deterrent to compliance with § 15. 
29. Part of the problem, of course, is that statutory terms like "defect" and "substantial product 
hazard" necessarily entail subjective analysis by firms. Congress's answer to this problem, however, 
was apparently to write even more "subjectivity" into the reporting requirements in new§ 1S(b)(3): 
firms are now required to report whenever their product "creates an unreasonable risk of serious 
injury or death." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991). Firms are left to wonder, of course, 
how this addition alters their obligation. 
30. Reports can be, and often are, filed with disclaimers as to the existence of a defect. "A 
Subject firm, in its report to the Commission need not admit or may specifically deny, that the 
information it submits reasonably supports the conclusion that its consumer product is noncomply-
ing or contains a defect .... " 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a) (1991). The disclaimer might look some-
thing like this: 
We would like to emphasize that this preliminary report is being made in order to comply 
fully with Commission regulations. The corporation does not believe a substantial hazard 
exists, nor that the Commission could so find pursuant to Section 15. 
/d. These disclaimers are typically included to blunt the effect of the defect notice, but the defect 
notice itself may be admitted into evidence in civil trials arising out of the alleged defect. See H.P. 
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fact, there may be nothing wrong with the particular product.31 Nonethe-
less, the Commission needs this information to enable it to act quickly and 
prevent product-related injuries. 32 
The Commission has attempted to increase reporting by issuing detailed 
regulations concerning the reporting requirements. 33 Despite the Commis-
sion's constant admonition that firms should err on the side of safety by re-
porting when in doubt, 34 firms retain a great deal of discretion due to Section 
15(b)'s subjective reporting criteria. Thus, the problem of underreporting is 
at least partially attributable to the imprecise language of the statute and its 
accompanying regulations. But in the twenty years since the enactment of 
the CPSA, Congress and the Commission have failed to increase compliance 
by providing detailed guidelines to firms. 
B. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY INTERFACE 
The reporting scheme outlined above is clearly designed to maximize the 
number of reports received by the Commission. Firms are required to report 
under the broad statutory and interpretive guidelines of the Act, but numer-
ous disincentives have led to underreporting. Perhaps the most significant 
disincentive is that the reports can become damaging documentary evidence 
that might be used against firms in pending and future products liability law-
suits. 35 It is perhaps unrealistic to expect firms to generate damaging reports, 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 345 N.E.2d 683, 687-88 (Mass. 1976) (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration recall notice). Once a report is discovered, and subsequently admit-
ted at trial, these rote "disclaimers" are likely to be viewed as mere self-serving statements. 
The Commission also attempts to offer some assurance to firms by excluding its definition of 
"defect" from products liability law: "Defect, as discussed in this section and as used by the Com-
mission and staff, pertains only to interpreting and enforcing the Consumer Product Safety Act. 
The criteria and discussion in this section are not intended to apply to any other area of the law." 
16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1990). Firms faced with the prospect of a costly products liability suit are not 
likely to be reassured by this. 
31. A firm is required to inform the Commission immediately when its product "contains a de-
fect which could create a substantial product hazard .... " CPSA § 15(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2064(b)(2) (1988). A product may be "defective" even if it is "manufactured exactly in accord-
ance with its design and specifications." 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1990). Consultations with insurance 
carriers and extensive investigations are discouraged. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12 (1990). 
32. Once informed of potential product hazards, the Commission can utilize its broad range of 
enforcement powers. See supra note 26. 
33. Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 16 C.F.R § 1115 (1990). 
34. See Brown, supra note 9, at 22 ("The message is-when in doubt, report."). The regulations 
are emphatic on this point. See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1990) (stating twice that subject firms should 
report when in doubt as to whether a defect exists). 
35. In federal suits, the§ 15(b) reports will often be admitted as party admissions. See FED. R. 
Evm. 80l(d)(2) (admission of out-of-court declarations allowed if they were made by the party 
against whom they are offered). If the firm submits a "disclaimer" with its § 15(b) report, the 
report probably will not be classified as a non-hearsay admission. Plaintiffs would likely still be 
successful in getting the report before the fact-finder, however, through Rule 803(6), the exception 
for records made in the regular course of business. See FED. R. Evm. 803(6). 
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often without the benefit of any significant investigation, without offering 
them some protection from prospective plaintiffs. 
The common law provides that a manufacturer or other seller is subject to 
liability for failing either to warn or to warn adequately about ·a risk or haz-
ard inherent in a product's design. 36 Evidence that indicates a manufacturer 
or other seller knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, 
that a product is defective may be highly relevant on such issues as a defend-
ant's prior knowledge of a defect, failure to warn, and the feasibility of any 
improved design. 37 By indicating the firm's awareness of a potential defect, 
Section 15(b) reports can lend credence to allegations of negligent warning or 
failure to warn. Even though the reports are often submitted in the early 
stages of investigation of a potential defect, they can greatly influence a jury, 
which will be presented with what it is told is written evidence of a firm's 
knowledge of a defect prepared by the defendant firm itself. Firms are un-
derstandably reluctant to provide such damaging evidence to potential 
adversaries. 
Section 15(b) reports also provide support for a strict liability claim that a 
product is "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous."38 By complying with 
Section 15, firms may unwittingly resolve the liability issue against them-
selves and lay the groundwork for a punitive damages award. In addition, 
compliance with Section 15 may lead to a recall campaign by the Commis-
sion. If this is the result, the recall order may be admissible as evidence of 
liability,39 representing convincing proof that the product is defective.40 Ad-
36. E.g., Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 1988). 
37. See id. at 652 (court refused to apply privilege to§ 15(b) reports in products liability action, 
due in part to their relevance as evidence). 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965) states: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .... 
While the Commission has made clear that its concept of "defect" is not applicable to any other 
area of the law, 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1990), such interpretive assurances are not likely to appease 
wary manufacturers. The information received under § 15, once presented to a jury, is likely to 
have devastating effects. 
Recent amendments to the CPSA serve only to heighten this concern. The Consumer Product 
Safety Improvement Act of 1990 extends the reporting requirement to cases where a firm has infor-
mation reasonably supporting the conclusion that a product "creates an unreasonable risk of serious 
injury or death." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991). This language contemplates a bal-
ancing test. See Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499, 508-10 
(5th Cir. 1980); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 838-40 (5th 
Cir. 1978). The test is very close to the standard of liability set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 402A, supra. 
39. See J. Michael Crowe & Douglas L. Day, Product Recalls as Evidence of Liability, 18 Prod. 
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 758 (July 6, 1990) (canvassing arguments for and against 
admission of both voluntary and government-mandated recalls). 
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mission of such evidence not only deters reporting under Section 15, but may 
ultimately tend to deter manufacturers from improving their products and 
voluntarily recalling products. Products liability judgments and settlements 
may reduce the funds available for valuable research or voluntary recalls.41 
Possible product liability exposure is one of the primary concerns of any 
company ·involved in the manufacture and distribution of consumer prod-
ucts. Prospective use of Section lS(b) reports in private litigation imposes 
significant disincentives on firms contemplating disclosure to the Commis-
sion. It is time to recognize these significant disincentives to reporting and to 
partially cure the problem by offering firms some assurance that their good 
faith efforts to comply with the reporting obligation will not result in sub-
stantial products liability exposure. 
II. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION FOR SECTION 15(B) REPORTS 
A. CURRENT PROTECTION FOR SECTION 15(B) REPORTS 
The CPSA does restrict somewhat the public disclosure of information 
received by the Commission.42 Generally, if a manufacturer could be 
harmed by the public disclosure of information concerning one of its prod-
ucts, the Commission is obligated to notify the manufacturer prior to disclo-
sure and to provide an opportunity for comment by the manufacturer.43 The 
Commission is also required to assure the manufacturer that any such infor-
mation is "accurate" and that disclosure would appreciably aid the effectua-
tion of the CPSA's purposes.44 
But the CPSA specifically provides for the disclosure of information re-
ceived under Section lS(b) in judicial proceedings,45 and the Commission's 
40. Before a recall order can be issued, the Commission must determine that the subject product 
actually presents a "substantial product hazard." CPSA § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d) (1988). 
41. This is especially true in the case of admission of any voluntary recall letters created by firms. 
Recalls are already an expensive undertaking, and the addition of products liability exposure may 
make costs prohibitive. 
42. The CPSA contains several restrictions on the disclosure of information. See CPSA § 6(b), 
15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1988). They were included in the CPSA in 1972 because Congress was aware 
that the release of inaccurate information by the federal agency charged with regulating the safety 
of consumer products could seriously harm manufacturers. For several years, the Commission took 
the position that § 6(b) only applied to Commission-initiated disclosures of information and thus 
did not affect the Commission's ability to release information under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1988). This position was rejected, however, by the Supreme Court. 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1980). 
43. CPSA § 6(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(l) (1988). 
44. CPSA § 6(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(6). 
45. CPSA § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5). This section reads in part: 
(5) ... [T]he Commission shall not disclose to the public information submitted pursu-
ant to [section 15(b)] respecting a consumer product unless-
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policy is to make information available '_'to the fullest extent possible. " 46 
Thus, protection for Section 15(b) reports is quite limited. Manufacturers 
have been unsuccessful in asserting that the CPSA protects their product 
hazard reports from civil discovery.47 By its terms, the CPSA only prohibits 
disclosure by the Commission, not disclosure in general. 48 The fact that only 
"public" disclosure is prohibited also cuts against any argument for protec-
tion; civil trials are not generally considered "public," and, in any event, 
. . ·protective orders are considered a plausible safeguard against wide disclo-
sure.49 Finally, the CPSA exempts from the general prohibition of disclosure 
any "information in the course of or concerning a judicial proceeding. " 50 
The CPSA thus does not protect Section 15(b) reports from plaintiffs' re-
quests for discovery,51 which perpetuates the problem of underreporting and 
jeopardizes the Commis~ion's effectiveness. 
B. SECTION 37 OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
OF 1990: A MODEL OF CONGRESSIONAL INSIGHT 
Recently, Congress grappled with the underreporting dilemma and passed 
new provisions to encourage firms to report product safety information to the 
(A) the Commission has issued a complaint under [section lS(c) or 15(d)] alleging 
that such product presents a substantial product hazard; 
(B) . . . the Commission has accepted in writing a remedial settlement agreement 
dealing with such product; or 
(C) the person who submitted the information under [section 15(b)] agrees to its 
public disclosure. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the public disclosure of ... information 
in the course of or concerning a judicial proceeding. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
46. 16 C.F.R. § 1016.1(a) (1991). Throughout its history, the Commission has favored disclos-
ing, not withholding, information. For example, the Commission has traditionally been reluctant to 
invoke the FOIA's exemptions from disclosure. See 16 C.F.R. § 1015.15(b) (1991) ("The Commis-
sion will make available, to the extent permitted by law, records authorized to be withheld under S 
U.S.C. § 552(b) unless the Commission determines that disclosure is contrary to the public inter· 
est."). This bias will only serve to heighten the underreporting dilemma and should be altered in 
the case of§ 15(b) reports. 
47. See Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Scroggins v. Uniden 
Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 
650, 652 (App. Div. 1988). 
48. Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 682. 
49. /d. at 683. 
SO. CPSA § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5) (1988). 
S 1. The Roberts court attacked the central premise of this note-that the threat of discovery of 
§ 15(b) reports significantly impedes the enforcement of the CPSA: 
[T]he language of§ 6(b)(5) concerning disclosure in a judicial proceeding indicates that 
Congress itself did not find the disincentive caused by disclosure through discovery to be 
as threatening to the functioning of the Act as [the defendant] suggests it would be. 
Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 683. 
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Commission. 52 The protections afforded some of this information are a use-
ful model for Congress to consider in the context of Section 15(b) reports. 
The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 199053 is the first major 
amendment to the CPSA in ten years, and is an effort to strengthen the 
CPSA through revision of the Commission's rulemaking procedures and re-
porting requirements. Specifically, Congress sought to increase reporting of 
potential product hazards to the Commission through the imposition of an 
additional reporting requirement. Section 37 of the CPSA 54 requires that 
any manufacturer whose product has been the subject of three product liabil-
ity suits within a two year period must file a report with the Commission. 
Filing a Section 37 report does not excuse a firm from reporting under Sec-
tion 15(b). 
Section 3 7 reports, like Section 15(b) reports, are comprised mostly of fac-
52. Under the Improvement Act Congress expanded § 15(b) by requiring firms to report when 
they obtain information that reasonably supports the conclusion that a product creates an "unrea-
sonable risk of serious injury or death," 15 U.S.C.A. 2064(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991), and when they 
obtain information which reasonably supports the conclusion that a product fails to comply "with a 
voluntary consumer product safety standard upon which the Commission has relied under section 9 
.... " 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(b)(1) (1988 & West Supp. 1991). Congress also increased the statutory 
penalties for nonreporting. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2069(a)(1) (1988 & West Supp. 1991). 
It is clear that Congress intended the amendments to lead to increased filing of reports. Senator 
Richard H. Bryan, sponsor of the Senate bill, commented concerning the "unreasonable risk of 
injury" amendment: 
There may be some situations, however, where reporting will be necessary under the new 
"unreasonable risk" standard imposed by the bill, as amended, but not under the current 
version of section 15(b). It is my expectation that, by establishing this additional criterion 
for reporting, the bill will encourage reporting by some firms who might now conclude 
that section 15(b) does not apply. 
135 CONG. REC. S10,052 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989). It is difficult to imagine many circumstances in 
which a company would decide that a reporting obligation arises under the new "unreasonable risk" 
language but not under the preexisting statutory language. However, it is clear that Congress be-
lieves more reporting is necessary and has taken steps to increase compliance with§ 15(b). Unfor-
tunately, the legislature simply has not gone far enough; the new "unreasonable risk" language is no 
more likely to foster compliance with § 15(b) than the preexisting language. Any regulations ulti-
mately drafted to explain the new requirement will probably be similarly unhelpful. 
53. Pub. L. No. 101-608, 104 Stat. 3110-3124 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2084 (West Supp. 1991). Section 37 states: 
If a particular model of a consumer product is the subject of at least 3 civil actions that 
have been filed in Federal or State court for death or grievous bodily injury which in each 
of the 24-month periods defined in subsection (b) result in either a final settlement involv-
ing the manufacturer or a court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the manufacturer of 
such product shall, in accordance with subsection (c), report to the Commission each such 
civil action within 30 days after the final settlement or court judgment in the third of such 
civil actions, and, within 30 days after any subsequent settlement or judgment in that 24-
month period, any other such action. 
/d. It is not clear why Congress devoted a separate section to lawsuit reporting and did not simply 
include the provision under§ 15. The result, as indicated below, might have been to exempt§ l5(b) 
reports from civil discovery. 
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tual data concerning potentially dangerous products. A manufacturer must 
report: (1) its name and address; (2) the model and model number or 
designation of the consumer product; (3) whether the lawsuit involved death 
or grievous bodily injury, and in the latter case a statement of the category of 
injury; and (4) whether the case resulted in a final settlement or judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff, and, if a judgment, the names of the case and court and 
the case number.55 What the Commission plans to do with the information 
received under Section 37 is unclear. 
Reporting under this section can have serious financial consequences for at 
least some firms. The Commission will probably analyze the information for 
broad injury trends, and under certain circumstances, a Section 15 product 
investigation will be initiated. In some cases, a Section 37 report may lead to 
a recall order or penalty assessment for failure to comply with the Section 
15(b) product defect reporting requirements. Thus, as is the case with Sec-
tion 15(b) reports, there are certain disincentives to reporting. 
But Section 37 does address the fear that compliance will lead to addi-
tional product liability exposure. A number of provisions ensure that these 
lawsuit reports will remain confidential. 56 For example, the manufacturer is 
not required to report the amount of any settlement when reporting a law-
suit. 57 The statute also provides that the report does not constitute an admis-
sion of liability, unreasonable risk of injury, product defect, substantial 
product hazard, imminent hazard, or "any other admission of liability under 
any statute or under any common law."58 These provisions demonstrate 
Congress's sensitivity to the products liability concerns of manufacturers. 
These concerns were also addressed in provisions protecting against disclo-
sure of Section 37 reports by the Commission. The statute explicitly states 
that neither the Commission nor the Department of Justice may publicly 
disclose the information reported under Section 37, and only a few author-
ized personnel are allowed to examine the information. 59 Most importantly, 
the statute further provides that lawsuit reports under Section 37 "shall not 
be subject to subpoena or other discovery in any civil action in a State or 
55. /d. 
56. Rep. Dun Ritter, in his statements regarding the Improvement Act, highlighted the protec-
tion afforded § 37 reports: "There are very strict confidentiality protections and stringent prohibi-
tions against the filing of such a report being deemed an admission of any kind." 136 CONG. REC. 
H11,908 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990). Contrast the treatment of§ 15(b) reports-very little confidenti-
ality and the opportunity for a self-serving "disclaimer" of product defect. See supra notes 30, 42-
51 and accompanying text. 
57. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2084(c)(3) (West Supp. 1991). 
58. /d. § 2084(d). 
59. /d. § 2084(e)(1). The penalty for officers and employees of the Commission who "willfully 
violate" the nondisclosure provisions may be dismissal. /d. § 2084(e)(5). 
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Federal court or in any administrative proceeding."60 In this portion of the 
Improvement Act, Congress has recognized the significant product liability 
deterrent to reporting and has provided additional incentives to encourage 
reporting through confidentiality.61 
The logic behind Section 37's confidentiality provisions can be extended to 
increase reporting of product hazard information under Section 15 by remov-
ing one of the most serious disincentives to reporting: the potential use of the 
reports in products liability actions. 62 Congress enacted blanket confidential-
ity protection for Section 37 reports in an effort to increase adverse risk infor-
mation reporting. Reports filed under Section 15, however, are at least as 
harmful as Section 37 reports in the context of products liability litigation. 
In fact, the implicit admission in Section 15(b) reports that a product is de-
fective63 provides an even greater concern to a reporting firm. In contrast, 
Section 37 reports merely document the commencement and settlement of 
lawsuits associated with a product, and do not reveal the amount of any 
settlement. 
The case for confidentiality is much more compelling under Section 15. 
Perhaps it is asking too much, in an age of government "sunshine," to urge 
Congress to protect product hazard reports from disclosure in civil discovery 
and subsequent trials. But given the endemic underreporting under the pres-
ent scheme, the Improvement Act's disclosure provisions present a valid 
model for strengthening Section 15 as an enforcement weapon.64 
60. /d. § 2084(e)(2). This clear bar against disclosure of§ 37 reports thus avoids the confusion 
that has arisen in connection with the discoverability of§ 15(b) reports. See infra Part III. 
61. See 136 CONG. REc. Sl6,482 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. John C. Danforth). 
"A crucial aspect of the new section 37 is its strict confidentiality provision. This will ensure that 
the increased reporting to the Commission has no effect on ongoing product liability litigation." /d. 
Two observations should be made about Senator Danforth's comments. First, the Senator appears 
to have abandoned his previous notion that products liability and the Commission operate in essen-
tially separate spheres. See supra note 5 (colloquy with Andrew Krulwich). Second, the Senator's 
observation is equally relevant to§ 15(b) reporting. Congress never explained why these reports are 
to be treated differently. 
62. See 136 CoNG. REc. Hl1,908 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990) (statement of Rep. Don Ritter). "I 
believe that this section [§ 37] has been carefully constructed to preserve maximum confidentiality 
while still providing the Commission with information that it can use to identify product hazards." 
/d. This conclusion highlights the fundamental inconsistency in the treatment of§ 15(b) reports. 
Almost twenty years of experience demonstrates the value of§ 15(b) reports, yet they receive little 
protection. By contrast, § 37 reports have yet to be tested, but their protection is virtually absolute. 
63. Under the amended § 15, firms are required to report when they have information that their 
product might create "an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(b)(3) 
(West Supp. 1991). This requirement implies that firms are to engage in a traditional risk-utility 
analysis before reporting and comes very close to the standard for strict products liability set forth 
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This test is followed in a majority of 
jurisdictions. 
64. The bar on discoverability may pose some problems in state courts, but this provision should 
be enforceable as a legitimate exercise of congressional power. State courts have repeatedly held 
that federal statutory restrictions on the discoverability of documents are valid acts of federal pre-
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With the Commission becoming increasingly dependent for enforcement 
upon the reporting requirements of the CPSA, it becomes crucial for Con-
gress to encourage reporting by any plausible means available. There will 
certainly always be those firms that simply choose to "gamble" that the 
Commission is incapable of full enforcement, but other firms might decide to 
report more fully if the fear of products liability exposure is removed. 
Although the efficacy of the Section 37 approach will be difficult to measure, 
it is at least plausible that fitms will be more likely to report if protected than 
if they are not. Congress expressed this judgment with respect to Section 37 
reports, and the same treatment should apply to Section 15(b) reports. 65 
III. ENCOURAGING COMPLIANCE THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE 
"SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE" 
Even in the absence of congressional action, there is another avenue avail-
able to provide protection for Section 15(b) reports: the emerging common-
law privilege for self-critical analysis. Courts faced with discovery requests 
seeking production of Section 15(b) reports can, and should, protect those 
reports against discovery to further the public policy goals of the CPSA. 
A. THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE 
In Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc., 66 a District of Columbia federal dis-
trict court held that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case could not dis-
cover hospital "peer review" committee minutes and reports. 67 The Bredice 
court found that ongoing self-analysis plays a critical role in ensuring that 
hospitals continually improve the care they provide to patients.68 In light of 
the "overwhelming public interest" in protecting this flow of ideas, plaintiff's 
emption. See, e.g., Martinolich v. Southern Pac. Transp., 532 So. 2d 435, 437-39 (La. Ct. App. 
1988) (applying federal highway safety statute protecting reports from admissibility), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 3164 (1989); Bishop v. Klein, 402 N.E.2d 1365, 1368-69 (Mass. 1980) (party must com-
ply with federal statutory procedure before Veterans Administration records could be discovered). 
65. If the self-critical analysis privilege, infra Part Ill, is to develop in this area, congressional 
action is potentially very useful. See Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the 
Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CoRP. L. 355, 381 (1987): 
Those persons interested in furthering the development of the [self-critical analysis privi-
lege] should consider asking Congress to provide for statutes in specific areas .... In 
advancing such proposals, however, the proponents of a [self-critical analysis privilege] 
must be prepared to make a compelling case on the facts. What will carry the day, if 
anything will, is a convincing demonstration that strengthening the common·law develop-
ment of the [self-critical analysis privilege] through legislation is in our collective self-
interest. 
66. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
67. /d. at 250-51. 
68. /d. at 250. 
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request for production was denied. 69 For the first time, a court had recog-
nized a privilege for "self-critical evaluation." 
Since Bredice, many courts, acting pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 70 have applied a "self-critical analysis" privilege in situa-
tions where there is a desire to promote the creation of socially useful infor-
mation by protecting it from discovery.7 1 The majority approach generally 
requires that three criteria be met before the privilege will apply: 
[F]irst, the information must result from a self-critical analysis undertaken 
by the party seeking protection; second, the public must have a strong in-
terest in preserving the free flow of the type of information sought; finally, 
the information must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if dis-
covery were allowed. 72 
69. /d. at 251. The court stated, "Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff 
meetings; and these meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment 
of patients .... To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery process, without a 
showing of exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations." /d. at 250. Thus, 
the rationale underlying the privilege was explicit-protection of information relevant to an inquiry 
in the public's interest. Bredice has won the day in the context of medical review procedures. See 
David W. Jorstad, Note, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants/or Revocation of 
Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 692, 694 n.ll (1979) (list of state statutes following 
Bredice by either providing immunity from civil suits for peer review participants or protecting 
medical review procedures from discovery or use at trial). Its application to other classes of docu-
ments is less certain. 
70. Rule 501 generally gives states the authority to determine the scope of individual privileges, 
and it eschews the creation of specific privileges in favor of flexibility. See SENATE CoMM. ON 
JUDICIARY, RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. ll (1974), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 ("[T)he recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relation-
ship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis."). The development of the 
self-critical analysis privilege has occurred primarily in the context of litigation in the federal courts. 
71. The privilege has generally been limited to certain types of self-analyses. See James F. Flana-
gan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 552 (1983) 
(courts have applied the privilege to confidential evaluations of peer reviews, affirmative action stud-
ies, and internal corporate investigations); David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege For Self-Critical 
Analysis. 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 115 (1988) (courts have applied the privilege to reviews of 
medical procedures, post-accident investigations, police department investigations, affirmative ac-
tion studies, and confidential peer reviews); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1983) (courts have applied the privilege to hospital committee reports, internal 
investigatory reports, and forms submitted to the government under Title VII). 
The privilege, to this day, is regarded as a nascent one and its parameters are uncertain. Several 
treatments can be found in the academic literature. See. e.g., Allen & Hazelwood, supra note 65; 
Nancy V. Crisman & Arthur F. Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate 'Self-Evaluative' 
Privilege, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1983); Flanagan, supra; Leonard, supra; Note, supra; Com-
ment, Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports-A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 51 MINN. L. 
REV. 807 (1973). 
This note is not intended to represent an exhaustive treatment of the self-critical analysis privi-
lege. This note accepts the general privilege of self-critical analysis and encourages its application 
to Section lS(b) reports and other reports submitted pursuant to product safety statutes. 
72. Note, supra note 71, at 1086. 
Commentators have searched for an appropriate definition of self-critical analysis. See Flanagan, 
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This formulation, however, has come under attack, as it sweeps too broadly 
and offers litigants an unduly broad veil of secrecy.73 Courts have limited 
application of this privilege to certain narrowly defined types of self-critical 
analyses. 74 
In addition to limiting application of the self-critical analysis privilege by 
identifying specific categories of eligible analyses, courts also have created 
broad exceptions to the application of the privilege. Two exceptions have 
been created that threaten to render the privilege a nullity, both of which 
should be rejected by the courts. 
The first exception involves a distinction between the factual and evalua-
tive components of a self-analytical report. Under this exception, the "fac-
tual" portions of a self-analysis are not protected.75 The vague and confusing 
nature of this exception severely weakens the social utility of the privilege. 76 
The prospect of a court attempting to dissect a "hybrid" report, with unpre-
dictable results, will lead to uncertainty and "chilled" evaluation-the very 
vices the privilege was developed to ameliorate. In addition, statutes that 
utilize reporting triggers such as "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" 
involve implicit evaluations, regardless of the nature of the information actu-
ally reported. While a governmental entity may rely solely on factual infor-
mation received through a self-critical report, the report's mere existence is 
supra note 71, at 556 (defining self-critical analysis as "a review of a major policy or procedure, 
conducted by or for top management to permit the evaluation and improvement of an organiza-
tion's operations"); Leonard, supra note 71, at 117 (proposing codification of privilege for "an inter-
nal review of a major policy or procedure, conducted by or on behalf of a business' management, 
and which contains subjective evaluations concerning the policy or procedure"). The courts have 
failed to set forth any definition. For purposes of this analysis, any government-mandated report 
requiring a regulated entity to analyze its own performance and compliance with government regu-
lations will qualify as a "self-critical analysis." Title VII reports, generally accepted as within the 
privilege, are a good example. 
73. See Flanagan, supra note 71, at 551 (noting judicial trend toward restricting privileges and 
expanding scope of discovery). This uneasiness with the prospect of a sweeping privilege has 
stunted the growth of the self-critical analysis privilege. Even today, courts are not sure of the 
privilege's boundaries. See Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, 133 F.R.D. 150, 153 (D. Haw. 
1990) (law regarding the "emerging" self-critical analysis privilege "remains unsettled"). Nonethe-
less, there are those who remain confident that this privilege will survive and develop further. See 
Allen & Hazelwood, supra note 65, at 357 (while development has been tentative, potential for 
development is great). 
74. See supra note 71; see also Dowling, 133 F.R.D. at 151 (since Bredice, most of the cases 
applying self-critical analysis privilege have involved Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
75. See Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 685 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (privilege does not 
extend to objective data in documents prepared for the Commission). 
76. See Flanagan, supra note 71, at 557-58 (distinction is "blurred" and courts have not specifi-
cally described materials that qualify for protection); Note supra note 71, at 1093-96 (factuaVevalu-
ative distinction is complex and costly). In addition, determining whether information is factual or 
evaluative may lead to expensive pretrial procedures, such as in camera inspections. Note supra 
note 71, at 1096. 
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evidence of an evaluation. Application of this exception will result in limited 
protection and limited confidence for self-analysts. 
The second exception to the privilege involves disclosure of otherwise pro-
tected information where the plaintiff shows "exceptional need."77 This ex-
ception has the advantage of recognizing that there are competing interests at 
stake. But instead of balancing plaintiffs' need for evidence against the social 
need for confidentiality, courts sometimes focus only on the plaintiffs' inter-
est. In many cases plaintiffs may have a legitimate need for the self-evalua-
tive reports. But this cannot be the end of the inquiry as the privilege was 
created to protect the free flow of socially useful information. Rather than 
examining plaintiffs' need for the information in a vacuum, courts should 
consider both the public interest in confidentiality and the plaintiff's need in 
order to serve the social needs which require self-analysis. 
The self-critical analysis privilege is intended to encourage full and candid 
disclosure of critical analyses to regulatory agencies. Regulated businesses 
will be reluctant to provide this information, even in the face of sanctions, 
unless they are assured that they will not be massively expanding their prod-
ucts liability exposure by complying. The goals of the privilege, as well as 
the needs of individuals, are served by the application of the privilege under 
the approach advocated in Part III.c of this note, without the counter-
productive exceptions for factual material or absolute deference to plaintiffs' 
interests. 
B. CURRENT TREATMENT OF SECTION 15(B) REPORTS UNDER THE SELF-
CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
In spite of compelling arguments for protection of Section 15(b) reports, 
defendants have been largely unsuccessful in their claims for protection. 
Firms reporting under Section 15 have made intermittent attempts to chal-
lenge the discovery of their substantial product hazard reports, 78 claiming 
that the reports are protected from disclosure and discovery by the self-criti-
cal analysis privilege under common law. Though shielding Section 15 infor-
mation would probably increase reporting of vital public safety information, 
courts have been generally unreceptive to claims of privilege. Of the three 
reported decisions addressing the issue, only one court held that a qualified 
77. Note, supra note 71, at 1097. This exception apparently stems from the original analysis of 
the privilege in Bredice. Since Bredice, most courts have focused on a balancing of the equities. See 
Leonard, supra note 71 at 123 (burden on party seeking disclosure under proposed codification to 
demonstrate that "its need for the information in the preparation of the case substantially outweighs 
the public benefit from nondisclosure"). 
78. Courts have split on whether § 15(b) reports are privileged from discovery in private litiga-
tion. Compare Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 685 (limited protection for§ 15(b) reports) with Scroggins v. 
Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (reports not protected from disclo-
sure) and Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653-54 (App. Div. 1988) (same). 
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self-critical analysis privilege applies to Section 15(b) reports. 79 Otherwise, 
courts have displayed both a general lack of appreciation for the significance 
of Section 15(b) reports in the Commission's enforcement arsenal and a mis-
conception about the workings of the CPSA. 
In Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 80 a federal district court in Indiana concluded 
that there are valid reasons for protecting firms that submit Section 15(b) 
reports. The court set forth what it believed to be the relevant standards: (1) 
"the materials must have been prepared for mandatory government reports"; 
(2) "[a]ny privilege extends only to subjective, evaluative materials"; (3) the 
privilege "does not extend to objective data in the same reports"; and (4) 
discovery will be denied "only where the policy favoring exclusion has 
clearly outweighed plaintiff's need."81 Applying these criteria, the court 
held that the manufacturer's Section lS(b) report was subject to a qualified 
privilege and ordered an in camera inspection to determine which portions of 
the report were protected. 82 
The self-critical analysis privilege applied in Roberts, which does not pro-
tect subjective material in Section 15(b) reports, results in little encourage-
ment to report product hazards. The court recognized the social interest in 
promoting full disclosure to the Commission by "assur[ing] fairness to per-
sons required by law to engage in self-evaluation."83 But the court went on to 
subject the Section lS(b) report at issue to an in camera inspection, presuma-
bly to extract and disclose the "factual" portions of the report. 
Requiring disclosure of factual data from Section 15(b) reports is not ade-
quate protection for the reporting process. Under the present Commission 
rules, firms are required to submit both an "initial" and a "full" report con-
cerning a potential substantial product hazard. 84 These reports are largely 
factual in nature. They contain, in part, an identification and description of 
the product, the name and address of the manufacturer, the nature and ex-
tent of the possible defect, and the nature and extent of the injury or risk. 85 
79. Roberts, 107 F.R:D. at 685. 
80. 107 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ind. 1985). 
81. /d. at 684 (quoting Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). 
82. /d. at 684-85. 
83. /d. at 684 (quoting O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980)). 
84. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.13(c), (d) (1991). 
85. /d. The necessary elements of an "initial" report are less comprehensive that what is re-
quired in a "full" report. For a full report, in addition to the elements in the initial report, firms 
must disclose the following: the date and manner in which the information was obtained; the total 
number of products and units involved; the dates when the products were manufactured, imported, 
distributed, and sold; an explanation of any changes that have been or will be effected to correct the 
defect; information that has been given to consumers, including drafts of any letters, press releases, 
or other written information; and an explanation of the marketing and distribution of the products. 
16 C.F.R. § 1115.13(d) (1991). 
There is little express "evaluation" necessary under these regulations. Consequently, application 
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Most of this information requires little evaluative effort on the part of the 
reporting finn. Given this limitation, the Roberts court was convinced that 
"the privilege will not protect much of what [the manufacturer] has submit-
ted" to the Commission. 86 A court examining Section 15(b) reports, how-
ever, must realize that the mere act of reporting is a form of self-critical 
analysis. 87 Before a Section 15(b) report is filed, a finn must evaluate the 
data and apply the appropriate analysis. The act of reporting, by itself, tells 
the fact finder that the manufacturer believes its product to be "defective" 
and a potential hazard to the public. The policy of encouraging the free flow 
of valuable consumer information is not served by a "privilege" that fails to 
protect these self-critical analyses. 
The only other reported decisions considering protection of Section 15(b) 
reports fail to account for the role that confidentiality can play in assuring 
adequate future reporting. In Scroggins v. Uniden Corp., 88 an Indiana state 
court refused to create a common law privilege for self-critical analysis, leav-
ing it for legislative enactment. 89 In dicta, however, the court expressed its 
doubts about the efficacy of using the privilege to encourage reporting of 
product hazards, dismissing as mere "recitals" the opinions of other courts 
indicating that protection was necessary for a successful reporting program 
and labeling such beliefs a "bald assumption. "90 
The court then went on to display its misunderstanding of the actual prac-
of the privilege to § 15(b) reports subject to the factual/evaluative exception affords virtually no 
protection to firms. 
86. Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 685. 
87. The same insight applies to other product safety statutes. See, e.g., National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988) (manufacturers required to notify Secre-
tary of Transportation when vehicle contains defect which "relates to vehicle safety"); Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1988) (any manufacturer, processor, or distributor of a 
chemical substance who learns that substance "presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the 
environment" must report to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency). The 
mere filing of such reports requires an "evaluation" of some sort, regardless of the specific informa-
tion reported. In other words, the decision to report is itself the evaluation, and the physical docu-
ment is merely the product of the evaluation. Section 15 is in the nature of a forced self-evaluation. 
88. 506 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
89. ld. at 86. 
90. /d. Other courts in similar contexts have also attacked the nexus between disclosure and 
underreporting. For example, in Martin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., No. 86-0603, 1990 WL 
158787, at *3 (D.D.C. May 25, 1990), the court set out the most common arguments against a 
disclosure/underreporting connection: 
(1) [R]eports are mandated and will continue absent protection; (2) no actual self-analysis 
occurs-performance is analyzed merely to comply with government reporting require-
ments; and (3) other deterrents to reporting already exist. None of these arguments is 
compelling as applied to CPSA reports. The fact that the reports are "mandatory" has 
not resulted in near full compliance. Self-analysis is implicit in the act of reporting itself. 
In any event, the fact that other deterrents exist is no reason not to remove the products 
liability deterrent. It may be the most significant deterrent. 
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tice under Section 15. The court was under the impression that a "responsi-
ble" firm that filed a product report with the Commission under Section 15 
would "cease distribution of [that product], or at least be ordered to cease 
and desist by the CPSC."91 But this conclusion fails to appreciate that firms 
are required to report whenever a product could constitute a substantial 
product hazard; the firm generally is not required to cease distribution imme-
diately. The Commission will order a recall, public notice, or replacement 
program only after it determines that a product actually constitutes a safety 
hazard. 92 Section 15(b) reports are merely preliminary analyses, and it is far 
from clear that a "responsible" firm must cease doing business simply be-
cause it has filed a report. Accordingly, the Scroggins decision failed to un-
. derstand the need for confidentiality for Section 15(b) reports. 
In Lamitie v. Emerson Electric Co., 93 a New York appellate court refused 
to recognize a privilege of self-critical analysis in the Section 15 context. 
That court simply was not convinced that "confidentiality is essential to the 
full maintenance of the relationship between [the firm] and the [Commission] 
•••• "
94 The court reasoned that full candor is mandated by the statute and 
was unpersuaded that the self-critical analysis privilege would increase re-
porting of product hazards to the Commission. Once again, the court failed 
to appreciate firms' reluctance to report in light of the potential products 
liability implications. Under the court's analysis, Section 15 itself mandates 
reporting, and thus confidentiality would not appreciably increase compli-
ance. But the court ignored what some commentators and Congress itself 
have realized-that in certain circumstances the adverse products liability 
implications of reporting may outweigh the adverse statutory implications of 
not reporting. 95 While confidentiality may not result in full compliance with 
Section 15, it is certainly a step in the right direction. 
C. A NEW TEST FOR THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
The self-critical analysis privilege should be redefined in a manner that is 
more narrowly tailored to promote the development of the socially useful 
information contained in self-critical analyses without creating an impenetra-
ble barrier to discovery. Protection should be granted where: (1) the report 
is required by law;96 (2) the institution mandating the report serves an impor-
9L Scroggins v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
92. CPSA § 15(c), (d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c), (d) (1988). 
93. 535 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. Div. 1988). 
94. /d. at 653. 
95. See Kahan, supra note 10, at 309. 
96. A number of courts have accepted this proposition. See e.g., Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 
F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (§ 15(b) reports protected if originally prepared pursuant to 
CPSA manda:te for Commission); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 374 (N.D. III. 
1982) ("To be privileged, the materials must have been prepared for mandatory government re-
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tant public function; (3) the communicative process is integral to the institu-
tion's goals and depends on confidentiality for continued viability; and (4) 
the party seeking disclosure of the report fails to demonstrate that the need 
for the material outweighs the public interest in confidentiality. 97 
This formulation of the privilege considers both plaintiffs' discovery inter-
ests and the public interest in the reporting of product safety information. 
First, its narrow scope leaves intact the general rule that the public "has a 
right to every man's evidence."98 Self-critical analyses will only receive pro-
tection in limited circumstances. 99 Second, this formulation also promotes 
the underlying rationale for the creation of the privilege: encouraging the 
free flow of socially useful information. Information reported under product 
safety statutes is undeniably in the public interest. 
Under the proposed formulation, Section 15(b) reports are compelling can-
didates for application of the evolving self-critical analysis privilege. Report-
ing of product problems is statutorily required for household products, 
automobiles, aircraft, chemicals, pesticides, medical devices, drugs, micro-
wave ovens, and many other products. 100 These reports serve an undeniable 
social need by protecting the public from product-related injuries. Moreover, 
government institutions rely heavily on mandatory reports from outside 
ports."); O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass 1980) (public policy behind 
privilege is "to assure fairness to persons who have been required by law to engage in self-evalua-
tion"). 
There are two rationales underlying this requirement. First, where a third party requires the 
preparation and reporting of self-critical information, notions of fairness counsel against disclosure. 
Second, where the requirement is imposed by the government, there is also an interest in encourag-
ing compliance with government programs. See Resnick. 95 F.R.D. at 374 (where self-evaluation is 
voluntary, "[n]either th[e] fairness rationale nor th[e] effective enforcement rationale operates .... 
No unfairness exists, for no third party required [the defendant) to make a critical self-evaluation 
or, indeed, any evaluation at all."). 
97. Although the Bredice court indicated that a plaintiff had to show "exceptional necessity," 
this requirement has been criticized as too strict. Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 100-01 (D.N.J. 
1989). Since Bredice, courts have generally applied a simple balancing test: plaintiffs' need for the 
material to make their case is balanced against the public interest protected by the privilege. Dow-
ling, 33 F.R.D. at 153. Thus, even under a simple balancing test, a plaintiff must overcome a 
forbidding "public interest" argument. 
98. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)). 
99. As a threshold matter, the report must be one that is required by law. Internal, voluntary 
product safety reports or memoranda, originated for internal use, cannot be shielded simply by 
forwarding the documents to the relevant institution. Also, confidentiality must be critical to the 
continued viability of the institution. If the institution is outside-source-dependent, the reports 
should be protected. If the institution does not rely substantially on the outside sources, courts need 
not preserve confidentiality. 
100. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (1988) (pesticides); 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988) (automobiles); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2607(e) (1988) (chemicals); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(l) (1988) (drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 360(i) (1988) (medi-
cal devices); 42 U.S.C. § 263g(a)(l) (1988) (microwaves and other electronic products); 49 C.F.R. 
§ 93.3(a) (1991) (aircraft). 
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sources in performing their functions. Reducing the flow of this information 
would harm the public by impairing the government's ability to regulate dan-
gerous products. 
Strong policy considerations justify shielding these documents from dis-
covery.101 Congress requires self-reporting in several statutes. Because are-
quirement to report is often triggered by a reporting party's subjective 
perception of an "unreasonable risk" or "defect," disclosure of such a report 
can have drastic consequences for the firm making it, including devastating 
products liability exposure. As a class, these self-analyses represent the clas-
sic confrontation between a party's liability concerns and a public agent's 
need for information. It is critical that efforts to understand and correct dan-
gerous product conditions are not blocked because companies fear that evi-
dence gathered as part of the corrective process will later be used against 
them. 102 
Specifically, the self-critical analysis privilege should be extended to pro-
tect the mandatory product defect reports required by Section 15(b ). Appli-
cation of the proposed requirements shows the utility of this approach. First, 
Section 15(b) reports are required by law. Second, the "important public 
function" criterion is met in the context of mandated reports under product 
safety statutes; a court should generally defer to the legislative judgment that 
the institution benefitting from the receipt of product risk information serves 
an important public function. The court, however, may consider the nature 
of the agency's task in determining whether to apply the privilege. For ex-
ample, the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction and its mission of prevent-
ing injury to the public are factors to consider. 103 
The third requirement-that the communicative process be integral to the 
101. In Ross v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the plaintiff sought investigative materi-
als compiled by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). While recognizing that 
NASD was not a governmental agency, the court applied the self-critical analysis privilege: 
There is a strong public interest in maintaining the integrity of effective industry self-
regulation. This interest would clearly be undermined by making NASD files fair game 
for any of the thousands of private securities fraud litigants across the country who wish 
to shortcut their own discovery efforts and instead to reap the benefits of the Association's 
ongoing, statutorily governed work. 
/d. at 24. Similar concerns are at work in the context of product safety statutes. 
102. Cf FED. R. Evm. 407 (subsequent remedial measures not admissible to prove negligence; 
social policy should encourage people to take, or at least not discourage them from taking, steps 
designed to increase safety). This social policy is particularly applicable in the case of product 
safety statutes. The self-regulation achieved through mandatory reporting requirements helps alert 
appropriate institutions to potentially dangerous products, devices, and substances. The result is a 
safer consumer environment and product safety innovations. 
103. Broad jurisdiction indicates that the institution affects a substantial portion of the public. 
Its success rate, while often difficult to measure, is an indication of its importance to the public 
safety. These factors are delineated simply to point out that courts should respect a legislative 
judgment regarding an institution's value to the public. 
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institution's goals and that confidentiality be essential to the communicative 
process-will require judicial scrutiny of the regulatory environment. This 
element should be construed narrowly. Where a defendant submits a self-
analysis to an institution that relies primarily on self-critical analyses to carry 
out its legislative mandate, confidentiality should be preserved. 104 An insti-
tution with limited appropriations will likely be such a dependent institu-
tion.105 Only if "chilling" the influx of product safety information 
substantially hinders the operation of the recipient institution should the 
privilege apply. 
The final proposed criterion-the "balancing of the needs" -should en-
compass an examination of both plaintiffs' discovery needs and the public 
interest in regulation dependent on confidentiality. 106 Product safety statutes 
are generally prophylaxes, focusing on the prevention of future harm. They 
are not concerned with providing compensation to injured plaintiffs. There-
fore, courts should accept the general premise that "long-term accessibility 
to vital information must not be sacrificed on the altar of immediate discov-
ery needs." 107 Where direct evidence of a product defect is available, prod-
uct safety reports should be immune from discovery. 
Firms subject to the mandatory reporting requirements of Section 15 need 
some positive assurance that compliance will not in the end prove more 
costly than noncompliance. These reports, if disclosed, are likely to be used 
104. The Commission is an excellent example of an institution that is heavily dependent on such 
reports. See supra Part I. 
lOS. Such institutions are not likely to engage in aggressive regulation and are highly likely to be 
dependent upon information from outside sources. Limited appropriations, however, are merely a 
factor to consider in determining reliance on self-analysts. An agency like the FDA, which receives 
several thousand reports annually on medical devices, will not be "disqualified" simply because it 
also receives healthy appropriations. 
106. It will be the rare case under the proposed formulation when the immediate discovery needs 
of plaintiffs outweigh the more general public interest in confidentiality. Nonetheless, this require-
ment is retained for judicial flexibility. If, for example, there is no direct evidence of defendant's 
culpability, the mandated self-critical analysis is highly probative and courts should consider order-
ing disclosure. While the test is utilitarian, not every case requires the sacrifice of plaintiffs' interests 
for the general good. Moreover, the privilege is generally regarded as a limited one. See Flanagan, 
supra note 71, at 573 (at most, self-critical analysis privilege provides only some protection for 
subjective conclusions). 
One could argue that defendants might shield themselves from liability by hiding behind a gen-
eral claim of "public interest," and that the truly relevant interest is the individual defendant's. 
But enforcing agencies are hampered by "chilled" analysts, and these agencies have a special duty 
to the public at large. See Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls, SSO F. Supp. 692, 703 (D. Md. 1981) 
(agency relationship exists between Commission and members of consuming public). Thus, placing 
the public interest in the scales is necessary. See Leonard, supra note 71 at 122 ("While protecting 
such studies from disclosure may mean the loss of possibly critical evidence for a litigant, the public 
gain from preventing disclosure may far outweigh that cost."); Note, supra note 71, at 1086 
(breadth of the "public interest" criterion largely determines breadth of self-critical analysis 
privilege). 
107. Note, supra note 71, at 1088. 
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against firms in private litigation on such issues as prior knowledge of defect 
and the feasibility of an improved design. It is a truism that firms are risk-
averse. If they believe that the least costly alternative is to not report, the 
Commission will receive few reports. Chronic underreporting harms the 
consuming public's primary agent, and hence the consuming public. 
Application of the self-critical analysis privilege to Section 15(b) reports, 
under either the majority standard outlined in Part liLA or the standard 
articulated here, is a valid solution to the tension between a public institu-
tion's need for reports and the self-analyst's fear of private suit liability. 
Although the privilege is not widely accepted, its application is warranted 
where there is strong public interest in the free flow of certain information. 
All consumers will benefit indirectly from application of the privilege to Sec-
tion 15(b) reports since increased reporting will presumably result in fewer 
consumer accidents. The interests of some relatively small number of indi-
vidual plaintiffs will be sacrificed where the privilege is applied to Section 
15(b) reports, but the public will ultimately benefit from a safer products 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with the vital task 
of assuring the safety of the American people against threats posed by defec-
tive or poorly designed products. Budget cuts and staffing problems force the 
agency to carry out this comprehensive mandate without investigative re-
sources equal to the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
the Commission is forced to rely upon the reporting requirements of the 
CPSA to carry out its responsibilities. Although the reporting requirements 
of Section 15 are couched in mandatory terms, it is clear that there is sub-
stantial underreporting of product hazards. Many firms, concerned that 
their product hazard reports might be used to their legal detriment in pend-
ing or future products liability suits, may choose to gamble and risk penalties 
for nonreporting. If the Commission is to be effective, this disincentive to 
reporting must be removed. 
This note offers two approaches to solving the inherent tension between 
manufacturers' fear of exposure and the Commission's need for information. 
Congress could follow the model of the lawsuit reporting requirement under 
the Improvement Act and bar discovery of Section 15(b) reports. Alterna-
tively, courts giving proper consideration to the significance of Section 15 as 
a primary enforcement weapon for the Commission could find that the re-
ports are protected by a limited common law privilege for self-critical analy-
sis. Either approach denies often deserving plaintiffs relevant information in 
their lawsuits, but the CPSA was meant in the first instance to prevent inju-
ries, not to assist those who have already been injured in seeking compensa-
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tion. Protection of the reports against civil discovery would help the 
Commission carry out its preventive mandate. Given the broad public inter-
est involved, these options should be seriously considered. 
